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Abstract 
 
Decision making sciences have begun to better understand and incorporate 
intuition in decision making models. Recent research has been focused on the 
effectiveness of intuition (Dane & Pratt, 2007) and the automatic processes of intuition, 
called heuristics (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014). The main aim of this study is to 
analyze the use of intuition in decision making, in situations of different levels of 
uncertainty and understand if intuition is used more as uncertainty increases or if there 
is a tendency to rely more on solid data and rational decision making. Researchers have 
suggested that intuition may be a useful asset in highly uncertain situations (Agor, 
1986), such as strategic management. However, the empirical evidence about the 
relationship between intuition and uncertainty is scarce. Obtaining a solid answer to this 
question will allow decision makers to better understand their behavior in highly 
uncertain situations and adapt decision making skills towards better results. 
 The study is based on an experimental design involving a sample consisted of 
215 subjects divided in three groups, one manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive 
system, one manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system and a last 
one that was not manipulated. Subjects evaluated packages that varied in the ratio of 
positive, negative and uncertain aspects. Results showed that the subjects default 
cognitive system changed when there was a change in the level of uncertainty, relying 
more on the intuitive cognitive system in more uncertain scenarios. In less uncertain 
scenarios, subjects showed no clear preference in used cognitive system. 
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1. Introduction 
There are two distinct decision making systems that are responsible for our daily 
decisions, the intuitive decision making system and the rational decision making system 
(D. Kahneman, 2003). The main aim of this study is to understand the behavior of 
decision makers in increasingly uncertain scenarios, regarding their use of intuitive 
modes of reasoning. As a future manager, the understanding of this paradigm of 
decision making in uncertain scenarios is fundamental for developing the right mindset 
and acquiring the correct methods to be prepared to deal with these very important 
cases. This study will also aim to understand which of the two decision making systems, 
the intuitive decision making system or the rational decision making system, has the 
most usage in very uncertain scenarios. 
The work of previous authors has allowed us to understand that the two systems 
described above have very different characteristics (D. Kahneman, 2012), namely in 
terms of speed, processes and consciousness. The intuitive system is faster than the 
rational system, as the latter functions based on rules and sequential processes. On the 
other hand, the intuitive system is automatic and functions based on holistic associations 
(Dane & Pratt, 2007). These differences, which will be further analyzed during this 
study, encourage a study of decision making in different scenarios as they guide the 
decision maker through different thinking processes which may reach different 
conclusions and trigger different decisions. 
In light of the recent advancements in data search and data analysis, decision 
makers are faced with tremendous amounts of information about potential decisions 
which apparently may reduce uncertainty. These enormous blocks of information are 
called big data and are defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as being “data of a 
very large size, typically to the extent that its manipulation and management present 
significant logistical challenges.”(Oxford English Dictionary as cited in Press (2014)). 
Big data is a tool that encourages the use of the rational decision making system, as it 
provides the inputs needed for better rational decision making. However, such an 
enormous amount of information, that reflects the complexity of a certain situation, can 
often be too extensive for the conscious human mind to fully understand its reach and 
consequences. Linking and analyzing all of this information is also an extremely 
difficult process, which may hinder the usage of big data. Nonetheless, big data allows 
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managers to analyze and forecast trends in key aspects of a corporation’s environment. 
On the other hand, big data may be insufficient in uncertain scenarios, in which trends 
are not predictable.  
It is also important to acknowledge aspects, besides the issues of analysis and 
treatment of information referred above, which present major hindrances towards real 
world usage of big data. We would highlight uncertainty as one of the issues that big 
data does not have a way to handle, and that can compromise the use of big data in these 
uncertain scenarios, as it may give the manager information that can be both non-
relevant and point towards erroneous decisions. For instance, big data may overvalue 
past information and miss key changes in the market where companies operate, which 
assume a particularly important position in strategic planning. 
When framing these decision making systems in today’s evolution on data 
search and data analysis, one may be inclined to think that the rational decision making 
system has the upper hand. However, it is our belief that the intuitive decision making 
system is an important process in very uncertain scenarios as it provides a more flexible 
approach to the changes in scenarios as they present themselves unexpectedly. 
In fact, there is no consensus on this topic. Some authors praise big data as the 
new revolution in management in uncertain scenarios (McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2012). 
However, other authors mention that expert intuition is a more powerful weapon in the 
fast changing corporate world, where uncertainty is very present (Dane & Pratt, 2007). 
Studies about intuition usually focus on what intuition is and how effective 
intuition is (Dane & Pratt, 2007). However, there is little data on the possibility of 
intuition being an asset in new scenarios of increasing uncertainty. Especially important 
would be to study how decisions in uncertain scenarios are made by decision makers, 
either leaning towards a more rational and data based approach or an intuition based 
approach which could be more effective when dealing with the issue of uncertainty. 
To conclude which of the two decision making systems is the most used in very 
uncertain scenarios the following questions were defined as the key research questions: 
Do decision makers rely more on intuition as uncertainty increases or do they rely more 
on rational/deliberative decisions? 
In order to answer the research questions posed above, an experimental 
methodology is used. Through extensive experimentation and observation of the 
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decision making process in situations of different levels of uncertainty, we will manage 
to get a more accurate perception of the usage of intuition in different scenarios.  
In addition to this introduction, this report will be structured in the following 
way: in Section 2, the literature review. In section 2, the relevant definitions of the main 
topics are discussed, as well as the main theories, focusing on decision making (2.1), 
intuition (2.2) and uncertainty (2.3). In section 2.4, some relevant and similar studies are 
analyzed in several aspects, including methodological issues. Section 3 describes and 
explains the methodology that will be used, including the identification of the best 
methodology and the explanation of the principles that theoretically support the 
methodology (3.1). In section 3.2 you may find the presentation of the results obtained. 
In section 4 you may find the discussion of the results obtained in the study. In section 5 
you may find the conclusion of the study as well as limitations of the study and ideas for 
further researches. Section 6 refers to the bibliography that supports this study. In 
section 7 you may find the Annex, where relevant parts of the experiment are presented, 
as well as the tables with the results of the statistical tests used.   
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2. Literature Review 
In this section you will find the literature review, which is divided in four 
distinct parts. In section 2, the relevant definitions of the main topics are discussed, as 
well as the main theories, focusing on decision making (2.1), intuition (2.2) and 
uncertainty (2.3). These will be explored both in a holistic and historic approach, in 
order to both clarify and contextualize the key topics that will be covered. In section 
2.4, some relevant and similar studies are analyzed in several aspects, such as 
theoretical advances and methodology. 
 
 
2.1. Decision Making and Rational Decision Making  
Decision making is defined by Business Dictionary as “The thought process of 
selecting a logical choice from the available options.” (BusinessDictionary.com, 2015). 
While this definition seems to be very broad, recent research requires the questioning of 
what a logical choice is, and whether decision making only arises from logical 
processes. Other authors define decision making by saying that “Decision making is the 
process of choosing the best alternative for reaching objective” (Certo & Certo, 2006, 
p. 182). Some authors also refer to decision making by focusing on the deliberation 
process and studying it. Busemeyer and Townsend (1993, p. 1) define deliberation as 
being “a time-consuming and effortful cognitive process that involves an extensive 
amount of information seeking, weighing of consequences, and conflict resolution”. 
This definition clearly strays towards the rational decision making system and contrasts 
with the intuitive decision making system, as will be explained further on. 
The definition of the rational decision making system used in this study is the 
one found in the work of D. Kahneman (2003), where he describes rational decision 
making as System 2, a slow, rule-governed and controlled decision making system. He 
goes on to show that System 2 is not the only decision making system used by decision 
makers, as opposed to what decision making theorists were stating during most of the 
20th century, and presents System 1, the intuitive decision making system. This duality 
of cognitive systems extends beyond decision making, as shown by Evans (2008). 
Decision making and understanding how decision makers decide between 
several different alternatives is a field that has been deeply explored. Earlier studies, 
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such as the expected utility theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 2007), set the trend 
on rational decision making, assuming that agents’ decisions are based on maximizing 
utility. Edwards (1954) wrote a paper detailing the evolution of decision theory, 
according to a rational decision making paradigm, where the several steps of the process 
are described. 
More recent research on decision making has focused on decision making in 
new scenarios of higher complexity or based on the use of intuition, such as the 
prospect theory (Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), and heuristics decision making 
theory (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). The prospect theory (Daniel Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) challenged the expected utility theory by showing that people, for 
instance through risk averse or risk seeking behaviors, would make decisions that are 
not rational, thus pushing towards a system which is not irrational in the sense that it 
follows a certain logic of behaviors and feelings, but also isn’t fully rational in the sense 
that it doesn’t respect the expected utility theory. The heuristic decision making theory 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) states that rational thinking may not be effective in 
most scenarios, where decisions need to be taken quickly. As such, these heuristics, 
which are mainly routine thinking processes, are not irrational in the sense that they 
provide a better return on the time/energy invested into them. In fact, many authors 
advance that decision making tends to be more heuristic/intuitive when time constraints 
are bigger (Tat, Hooi, Rasli, Chin, & Yusoff, 2010). Nonetheless, these heuristics are 
more prone to failure than logical thinking. 
 
 
2.2. Intuition and Intuitive Decision Making 
As stated before, research about intuition has been mostly concerned with its 
definition, biases and effectiveness (Dane & Pratt, 2007) in different contexts. As seen 
in Table 1, authors have failed to agree on a single definition. As pointed by Khatri and 
Ng (2000), these differences of definition are far from being trivial, and present 
significant changes in the way intuition is studied. However, most of the authors agree 
on certain points, which Dane and Pratt (2007) sum up in the following definition: 
“Specifically, our review of the various literature on intuition has tended to converge on 
four characteristics that make up the core of the construct: intuition is a (1) non-
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conscious process (2) involving holistic associations (3) that are produced rapidly, 
which (4) result in affectively charged judgments.” (Dane & Pratt, 2007, p. 36). This 
definition can be integrated into the most common theories related to  intuition and 
decision making, such as dual-process theories of cognition (Akinci & Sadler-Smith, 
2012) and heuristics in decision making (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). This 
definition arises from years of advances in the conceptualization of what intuition is, 
and clearly contrasts with some of the earlier definitions which are shown in table 1. 
Several authors consider that defining intuition is still an ongoing process of the 
uttermost importance (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Khatri & Ng, 2000), as intuition can only be 
fully studied once it has been clearly defined. Some of the concepts which are mistaken 
frequently as being intuition are instinct and insight (Hodgkinson, Sadler-Smith, Burke, 
Claxton, & Sparrow, 2009). They are, however, very different concepts. As stated by 
Hodgkinson et al. (2009), “instinct pertains merely to hardwired, autonomous reflex 
actions (…) or the behavior patterns of certain animals (such as the homing instinct in 
birds). Insight, on the other hand, is a sudden and unexpected solution to a problem, 
arrived at after an impasse has been reached and an incubation period has elapsed.” 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2009, p. 279).  
Advances in the fields of decision making have led to a wider acceptance of 
intuition as tool for decision making, which was historically seen as feminine, illogical 
and somewhat unacceptable (Agor, 1986). Today, intuition is seen as one of the tools 
for tackling complexity in fast and changing environments (Dane & Pratt, 2007). With 
the rise of the prospect theory (Daniel Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) as an approach that 
is more connected to real world decision making, as opposed to the expected utility 
theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993), intuitive decision making and consequent 
heuristics are being proposed as more viable tools for dealing with uncertainty (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1992). Most notably, research about intuition and strategic decision 
making, which is by nature a situation where uncertainty is high, has been developed by 
researchers of intuitive decision making (Agor, 1986; Khatri & Ng, 2000; Woiceshyn, 
2009). 
Nonetheless, there is a lack of empirical research on intuition and decision 
making in scenarios of great uncertainty (Dane & Pratt, 2007), being one of the fields 
that requires further study about the possible links among intuition and uncertainty. As 
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seen in the works of Agor (1986) and Dane and Pratt (2007), researchers advance the 
idea that intuitive decision making is key to analyzing highly uncertain scenarios, but 
don’t form a clear link  between concepts (Agor, 1986; Dane & Pratt, 2007). Agor 
(1986) goes as far as showing that executives relied on intuition in scenarios of great 
uncertainty (Agor, 1986), but doesn’t explore this link any further (for instance, trying 
to establish a concrete correlation between intuitive decision making and uncertainty). 
What this work intends to study is the link between the use of intuition and the variation 
of the level of uncertainty of a given scenario. 
 
 
Source: Extracted from Dane and Pratt (2007) 
 
 
 
Table 1 Definitions of Intuition 
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2.3. Uncertainty 
Uncertainty is a concept that is still not totally defined, and as such several 
different conceptualizations can be found (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). Table 2 shows 
some of these different concepts, and clearly highlights the confusion among 
researchers about what is risk and what is uncertainty. Uncertainty was very well 
defined in a book from 1921, from Frank Knight, which has undergone several reprints 
and remains very relevant in economic theory. In this book, Frank Knight distinguishes 
risk from uncertainty: “Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the 
familiar notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated. (...) The 
essential fact is that 'risk' means in some cases a quantity susceptible of measurement, 
while at other times it is something distinctly not of this character; and there are far-
reaching and crucial differences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which 
of the two is really present and operating. (...) It will appear that a measurable 
uncertainty, or 'risk' proper, as we shall use the term, is so far different from an 
unmeasurable one that it is not in effect an uncertainty at all.”(Knight, 2012, pp. 19-
20).  As such, the main difference between risk and uncertainty relies on the capacity to 
measure (or not) a certain event. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) advanced that not all 
uncertainty is the same, and that uncertainty may be defined by both issue and source. 
In terms of issue, the most basic variations of uncertainty are related with outcomes, 
situation and alternatives. In terms of source, the most basic variations of uncertainty 
are related with incomplete information, inadequate understanding and undifferentiated 
alternatives.  
Uncertainty is a concept that is often confused with risk, but has very different 
implications for the rational decision making theories. It clearly sets the tone for a new 
way of approaching decision making theory, since the expected utility theory 
(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993) shows key flaws when analyzing uncertain situations. 
The expected utility theory works based on probabilities, which can only be defined 
when there is enough information to measure and compare. In uncertain scenarios, the 
lack of information, either regarding inputs, relations among variables, or outputs, 
makes it impossible to expect anything. For instance, there is no feasible way of 
defining the probability of a dice landing on a given face if you don’t know how many 
faces the dice has. Should someone know this information, landing on a given face 
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would have a probability, and therefore be risky. Without knowing any information, 
landing on a given face doesn’t have a probability, and therefore is uncertain.  
Studies on uncertainty have provided new definitions in economic behavior 
research, and new understandings of the limitations of forecasts ,as described in the 
paper by Makridakis and Taleb (2009): “First, in most cases, errors are not 
independent of one another; their variance is not constant, while their distribution 
cannot be assured to follow a normal curve—which means that the variance itself will 
be either intractable or a poor indicator of potential errors, what has been called “wild 
randomness” by Mandelbrot (1963). Second, there is always the chance of highly 
unlikely or totally unexpected occurrences materializing — and these can play a large 
role (Taleb, 2007). Third, there is a severe problem outside of artificial setups, such as 
games: probability is not observable, and it is quite uncertain which probabilistic model 
to use.” (Makridakis & Taleb, 2009, pp. 717-718). In fact, the works of Mandelbrot 
(1997) on wild randomness and Taleb (2010) on black swans are cornerstones of the 
understanding of uncertainty, as well as the effects of uncertainty on long term decision 
making, forecasting and similar processes that rely on a highly unstable future.  
Despite what has been said before, successes in these uncertain scenarios are 
very characteristic in the corporate world, and some are transformed into case studies of 
how intuition may generate value.  Some of these cases are described in the work of 
Miller and Ireland (2005), from the purchase of the McDonald’s brand by Ray Kroc to 
the launch of the iconic Dodge Viper. One of the most told stories is the one of the entry 
of Honda in the US motorcycle market, where despite very conservative reasons to 
enter the market, and amidst a very uncertain expectation of how consumers would 
adopt the product (lack of motorcycle culture, lack of retail spaces, etc.), the CEO 
decided against data and evidence and invested in this market, generating the results we 
know today.  
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Table 2 Conceptualizations of Uncertainty 
 
Source: Extracted from Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) 
 
 
2.4. Relation between intuition and uncertainty 
Agor (1986) is the first one that clearly shows that there is some sort of 
relationship between uncertainty and intuition and it clearly stands out, both by the 
importance of the discovery, especially at the time of the writing of the paper, and by 
the quality of the study, since it is still a relevant source of information today 
concerning intuition in corporate scenarios. 
This study coincided with the rise of awareness of the value of intuition as a 
decision making approach. At the same time there was an increasing awareness of the 
flaws of reason-based decision making in strategic decision making, especially because 
of the uncertainty present in this kind of decision making (Agor, 1986). Developments 
in  research on brain processes and cognition generated new discoveries in the fields of 
Decision Studies, thus being another factor of motivation for the realization of the study 
(Agor, 1986). 
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While intuition wasn’t clearly defined at the time of writing of Agor’s paper, 
which may hinder the findings as stated before, the methodology and findings are still 
of great importance to the study of the subject.  The study concluded that except for one 
case, every executive acknowledged that they use intuition to guide the decision making 
process in their most important decisions. However, managers felt the need to clarify 
that intuition was only one of the processes they used in decision making, 
complementary to others. Executives described that good decisions based on intuition 
mostly derived from previous experiences, known facts and an ability to be open to 
subconscious processes.  
More importantly for the perspective of this study were the following findings 
about the circumstances in which intuition helped the subjects the most and when did 
they seek to use intuition. The answers were the following: “(1) when a high level of 
uncertainty exists, (2) when little previous precedent exists, (3) when variables are less 
scientifically predictable, (4) when "facts" are limited, (5) when facts don't clearly point 
the way to go, (6) when analytical data are of little use, (6) when several plausible 
alternative solutions exist to choose from, with good arguments for each, (7) when time 
is limited and there is pressure to come up with the right decision” (Agor, 1986, p. 9). 
All of these are scenarios of high complexity, of which uncertainty is a part of. Thus, 
this is the first empirical finding that clearly shows a link between intuition usage and 
uncertainty. As such, this work by Agor is one the cornerstones of this thesis as it 
portrays a question which was only superficially explored both by this author and 
following researches. Of course it is necessary to look at this paper from Agor (1986) 
and realize that it is a very old study. Cultural, social, technological and many other 
changes in society; new insights about intuition’s effectiveness; the evolution of data 
collection, processing and forecasting; all of these are aspects which foster the change 
of the status quo regarding the usage of intuition, which could alter the results of the 
study of Agor if conducted today. Nonetheless, further studies have been sustaining the 
same conclusions found by Agor (1986).  
Burke and Miller (1999), in their interviews with 60 professionals of different 
sectors, whose jobs often involved decision making, found that these professionals 
reported using intuition in situations involving human interaction, time constraints and 
uncertainty, such as first time projects. 
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Bocco and Merunka (2013) studied the behavior and decisions from West 
African managers with the aim of understanding real life decision making in smaller 
institutions, as opposed to the regular focus on well-established corporations. Some of 
the differences that these institutions face are pointed out as key factors that may 
influence decision making, such as access to information, speed of decision and lack of 
managerial training and knowledge (Bocco & Merunka, 2013). Focusing on the 
definition of intuition developed by Dane & Pratt, they confirm that small and medium 
enterprise owners from West Africa have the perception that they follow their intuition, 
and these managers give the following reasons to do so: (1) trusting positive feelings 
(Bocco & Merunka, 2013), which relates to various studies concerning the “gut feel” 
and its importance in decision making (Sadler-Smith & Shefy, 2004); (2) lack of 
knowledge, (3) necessary speed of decision making, (4) trusting past experience, (5) 
allows for affective judgments in people related decisions. (Bocco & Merunka, 2013). 
Although different from the objective pursued in this research, one must 
acknowledge some similarities between managing smaller companies with lack of 
means to collect and analyze data, and uncertain scenarios where data may be missing, 
or the relationship between variables may be unclear. As such, this study by Bocco and 
Merunka (2013) helps reinforce the belief that intuition is a key weapon for deciding in 
uncertain scenarios. 
The study of Tat et al. (2010) aims to understand decision making in several 
aspects one of which is “to identify the relationship between intuitive decision-making 
style and situation factors” (Tat et al., 2010, p. 2). This objective clearly relates to the 
goal pursued by this study, and thus presents several similarities. One of the hypotheses 
of this study was to test, the relationship between uncertainty and intuitive decision 
making. However, after statistical testing the results showed no significant correlation 
between the intuitive decision making style and uncertainty. While this could be a very 
conclusive response, it is important to understand that the sample consisted of a very 
homogeneous group (faculty staff), which may introduce a bias to the results presented. 
The work of Khatri and Ng (2000) approached the study of intuition in decision 
making with a focus on the empirical confirmation of results at a time where empirical 
research was very scarce. The authors were also concerned about the relation between 
intuition and organizational performance. Although the objective of the present study 
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disregards the link of intuition with organizational performance, one must acknowledge 
the tendency of engaging in a more active usage of intuition when such usage presents 
positive results. The authors hypothesize that “use of intuitive synthesis in strategic 
decision making is greater in an unstable environment than in a stable environment” 
(Khatri & Ng, 2000, p. 65). The authors focus on defining and clarifying the concept of 
environmental instability which is similar to the definition of uncertainty portrayed in 
this study, as they selected some variables which affect companies in ways which can’t 
be measured quantitatively. By selecting three different industries (computer, banking 
and utility), the authors define three scenarios of different degree of instability. 
They concluded that the use of intuition is clearly more prevalent in the unstable 
scenarios compared to the other scenarios. 
Mousavi and Gigerenzer (2014) make a very clear point in suggesting that the 
business world is very different from a “roulette table”, and often presents situations of 
uncertainty instead of situations of risk, and highlights the problems of current tools in 
dealing with uncertainty. “Observe, however, that most of decision theory is based on a 
risk characterization of the uncertain world. But can risk based rules successfully apply 
to a world of uncertainty? It depends. The structural difference between risk and 
uncertainty calls for rules of dealing with uncertainty that are not compatible with risk 
calculations unless uncertainty can be reliably reduced to a form of risk. Unique 
situations, uninsurable risk, and lack of properties that satisfy the mathematics of 
probabilities are all cases in point. In a world of uncertainty, heuristics are 
indispensable tools, not second-best solutions” (Mousavi & Gigerenzer, 2014, p. 1672). 
As such, their take on dealing with uncertainty relies on what heuristics and ecological 
rationality can do to help in understanding these uncertain scenarios and quickly 
generate analyses and decisions. 
Lipshitz and Strauss (1997) also suggest that decision makers deal with 
uncertainty by creating qualitative frameworks that can guide their decisions. These 
qualitative frameworks do not quantify the risks, but provide strategies for 
acknowledging and reducing uncertainty (Lipshitz & Strauss, 1997). In short, one could 
advance that the intuitive system, based on its ability of constructing similar and 
comparable scenarios based on previous experiences, can provide a way to measure 
what is rationally immeasurable. By doing this, the intuitive system transforms 
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situations which are defined as uncertain, when using the rational system, into situations 
of risk, in the sense that it becomes measurable, when analyzed by the intuitive system. 
This “solution” encompasses what was referred above by Mousavi and Gigerenzer 
(2014), thus transforming this “uninsurable risk” into something that can be somewhat 
measured and taken into analysis. 
One study that reflects the importance of the duality between intuition and 
deliberation in decision making in uncertain scenarios is present on the study of 
Locander, Mulki, and Weinberg (2014), where intuition and deliberation are weighed 
on their ability to deal with human emotions on the perspective of the salesperson. As 
the study highlights, dealing with people in sales scenarios requires very fast decision 
making, more associated with intuition, as changes in posture or tone from a buyer 
require an adaptation from the seller. These changes are uncertain, as is human 
interaction generally, and thus intuition is key to understanding and dealing with this 
uncertainty. Nonetheless Locander et al. (2014) recognize the importance of the 
deliberative process and suggest that an integration of both intuition and deliberation 
provides the best solution for salespeople, in order to adapt to unexpected changes in 
customer behavior and keep a rational analysis of key features and processes of a sale 
that do not change. 
Zakay, Brauner, Weyers, Russo, and Usher (2011) developed a study on the 
quality of the intuitive cognitive system and the rational cognitive system for evaluating 
different scenarios, specifically in perceiving the quality, defined as the percentage of 
positive features in the total number of features, of cars or holiday packages based on 
their attributes. This study clearly separated the two cognitive systems by using the 
direct instruction method for directing the subjects towards one of the two cognitive 
systems, which is followed by an evaluation of their decisions. The group directed 
towards the intuitive cognitive system proved to be more accurate in perceiving the 
overall quality of the presented cars / holiday packages. This study inspired the 
methodology used in this thesis, and will be explored in more detail further on in the 
methodology section of this thesis. 
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3. Methodological issues and objectives  
After this literature review some aspects become evident, and help shape the 
methodology of this thesis. Firstly, we highlight the fact that researchers, such as 
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) are now considering the intuitive cognitive system as a 
valid option for decision making after years of only considering the rational/deliberative 
cognitive system. Secondly, we point out that the intuitive cognitive system produces 
different decisions from those of the rational/deliberative cognitive system. As shown 
by Gigerenzer, ecological decisions hold value in certain scenarios (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Thirdly, we observe that uncertainty exists in real world decision 
making and that uncertainty changes the way people perceive events and decide. 
Finally, there is a clear lack of empirical information on how the different cognitive 
systems react to uncertain situations and which cognitive system decision makers are 
more prone to use in decision making in uncertain scenarios (Dane & Pratt, 2007).  
One of the main issues noted during the literature review, when critically 
analyzing similar studies about intuition and uncertainty in decision making, was the 
way intuition was measured. It remains a fact that measuring intuition is an extremely 
complex task, and requires much effort and expertise in order to be done in an 
acceptable way. One study that clearly approaches the difficulties and limitations of the 
measurement of intuition was done by Dane and Pratt (2009). It extensively analyses 
previous studies and organizes the way intuition was measured into either being (1) 
direct instruction, (2) retrospective reports, (3) incubational methodology, (4) scenario 
based, (5) neurological and physiological approaches. This study will measure intuition 
using both the scenario based method and the direct instruction method in conjunction. 
The rational models of expected utility state that humans decide based on the 
expected value of a given choice. As such, they would be able to clearly analyze 
situations and define the utility value of each outcome. However, this model does not 
take into account uncertainty. In uncertain scenarios, the outcomes and/or probabilities 
of the outcomes are not known, and as a result, the expected utility of a choice is not 
measurable. Therefore in a rational model, we would expect that uncertainty would not 
affect the results, as uncertainty cannot be fitted into a purely rational analysis due to 
this issue of measurement. The main implication of this statement is that no rational 
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model can measure uncertainty, and therefore there all analyses that take uncertainty 
into account are, to some extent, intuitive. 
As stated before, the main research question is related with the understanding of 
how uncertainty affects decision making. Formulating testable hypotheses that allow us 
to answer this question requires some additional explanations, mostly related to issues 
in the measurement of intuition. As such, and for an explanatory purpose, this question 
is divided into two sub-questions that, in conjunction, will allow us to answer the main 
question. The first sub-question “S.Q. 1” is “In decision making in uncertain scenarios 
are we more prone to use the intuitive cognitive system or the rational/deliberative 
cognitive system?”. This question cannot be answered directly because, as explained 
before, measuring the decision making system that a person uses to decide is an 
extremely difficult task. We must develop an alternative question that can help us define 
the reaction of each cognitive state to uncertainty. Therefore, we will rely on the second 
sub-question “S.Q. 2”, “How do the different cognition systems react to uncertainty?”. 
This question can be answered, and this thesis will follow a methodology similar to the 
one used by Zakay et al. (2011) to answer it. We will also attempt to confirm their 
results in order to build a more solid foundation for our results. While we will explore 
more thoroughly their methodology further on, we can summarize the steps needed in 
the following way: 
1- Define scenarios which vary in their ratio of good/bad attributes and introduce 
three different uncertain scenarios by restricting the amount of available 
information; 
2- Direct the subject towards a cognitive system that fosters intuitive decision 
making and keep a record of the decisions made by the subjects, for each 
scenario; 
3- Direct the subject towards a cognitive system that fosters deliberative decision 
making and keep a record of the decisions made by the subjects, for each 
scenario. 
 
After obtaining the inputs specified in steps 2 and 3, we will be able to answer 
S.Q. 2. We will then proceed to perform the same experiment, but without manipulating 
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the subjects towards a specific cognitive state, obtaining the decisions one would 
normally make absent from any guidance. 
Then, by comparison (using proper statistical methods) it is possible to establish 
a relationship between the decision that suffered from the manipulation towards one of 
the two cognitive systems and the unbiased decision, for each of the different scenarios. 
This comparison allows us to verify if in uncertain scenarios people drift towards a 
more intuitive or deliberative decision making cognitive mode. 
As with any methodology, this particular one also suffers from some faults. We 
should highlight there is no direct measurement of cognitive modes of thought in 
uncertain scenarios, thus leading to a margin of doubt in the results. We must also 
underline that each individual may have a different propensity for using each of the 
cognitive modes of thought. Nonetheless, with a large enough sample we may accept 
that these flaws will fade and that the results will drift towards a normal distribution.  
 
 
3.1. Method Design and hypotheses 
As explained above, this methodology will follow an experimental design, 
inspired, to some extent, by the one used by Zakay et al. (2011). Although this paper 
clearly presented an interesting way of analyzing the differences between the two 
cognitive systems in decision making, it is not without its faults. More specifically, the 
study tried to adapt to the preferences of each subject, when developing the packages 
that would be evaluated afterwards, by asking subjects to start by developing a ranking 
between the several possible attributes (presented in a neutral way). The study then uses 
these perceived values to present packages that respect the rankings, for instance by 
presenting the eight best ranked attributes as positive and the four worst ranked 
attributes as negative. The goal of this ranking is to make sure that the packages are 
balanced and that no individual attribute would steer the results. However, by not 
considering that the ranking does not reflect the weight of a given attribute in the overall 
presented attributes it fails to presented the proposed balanced packages. For instance, 
in an extreme scenario we could say that a subject may give a weight of 51% to one 
specific attribute and a weight of 49% to the rest of the combined attributes. In this 
scenario the decision would rely solely on whether the most important attribute is 
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presented on a positive or negative way. As such, this ranking should have also 
considered the individual weight of each attribute when defining the ranking, and 
ultimately the packages. 
Although we acknowledge these issues, we will not be able to act accordingly 
and develop this methodology reflecting what has been said above due to lack of 
technical knowledge in programming and lack of access to software that would make 
the technique above specified possible. However, we will also not adopt any kind of 
ranking as we believe that the attributes are, on average, similarly weighted and even 
more so when applied to a large number of subjects that will dissipate possible 
individual distortions.  
In order to create a manipulation of the cognitive system that we want to 
evaluate, we will follow the direct instruction method, suggested by previous authors 
(Dane & Pratt, 2009). As such, in the beginning of the experiment the subjects  receive 
a description of how they should attempt to think about their decisions, similar to that 
presented in the work of Zakay et al. (2011). The exact instructions used are presented 
in Annex A of this thesis. By applying the method of direct instruction, as used by 
authors in several other empirical papers that attempt to capture the differences between 
the dual decision making cognitive systems, we separate subjects by the cognitive 
system used for making the decision about the choices presented. Please note that the 
instructions given are very similar, and tested by Zakay et al. (2011), thus not creating 
any biases besides the intended one. The third group is not presented with any direct 
instruction that could manipulate the used cognitive system, so as to not create any bias. 
Therefore, this third group relies on the use of the default cognitive system, which is 
what this study aims to understand. 
After this direct instruction for the two biased groups, and no instruction for the 
other group, the subjects are asked to rate a holiday package based on the attributes 
presented. Six packages are presented, three of them (packages C, A and E) following 
the methodology used by Zakay et al. (2011) and  three others that comprise different 
levels of uncertainty (packages B, F and D). The first three packages (C, A and E) are 
presented from the most useful/desirable package to the least useful/desirable packages. 
The other three packages (B, F and D) are presented from the least uncertain package to 
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the most uncertain package. These packages are as follows (the full attributes used for 
the packages may be found in the Appendix): 
- Package C will contain 12 attributes, 8 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, with the remaining 4 being presented in a way 
that  is not considered useful/desirable; 
- Package A will contain 12 attributes, 6 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, with the remaining 6 being presented in a way 
that  is not considered useful/desirable; 
- Package E will contain 12 attributes, 4 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, with the remaining 8 being presented in a way 
that  is not considered useful/desirable; 
- Package B will contain 12 attributes, 4 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, 4 being presented in a way that is not considered 
useful/desirable and the remaining 4 being presented in a way that can’t be 
evaluated (for instance, we may say that the location of vacation package B is 
unknown, and thus not measurable in terms of usefulness or desirability). 
- Package F will contain 12 attributes, 3 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, 3 being presented in a way that is not considered 
useful/desirable and the remaining 6 being presented in a way that can’t be 
evaluated (for instance, we may say that the location of vacation package F is 
unknown, and thus not measurable in terms of usefulness or desirability). 
- Package D will contain 12 attributes, 1 of which will be presented in a way that 
is considered useful/desirable, 1 being presented in a way that is not considered 
useful/desirable and the remaining 10 being presented in a way that can’t be 
evaluated (for instance, we may say that the location of vacation package D is 
unknown, and thus not measurable in terms of usefulness or desirability). 
 
As explained before, these packages were already tested by Zakay et al. (2011) 
so as to safeguard that each attribute is not significantly more important than the others.  
Subjects will be asked to rate these packages on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being 
the worst classification and 10 being the best classification. After receiving the answers, 
we analyze which cognitive system tended to provide an answer closest to what is the 
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expected answer (a package that has more positive attributes should be chosen over a 
package that has more negative attributes, provided that the attributes have similar 
importance). Also, we compare the answers given in the uncertain scenario by the 
subjects that were pushed towards using one of the two cognitive decision making 
systems with the ones provided by the unbiased group. When the answer of the biased 
group’s perceived value is closer to the unbiased group’s perceived value, we may 
conclude that in uncertain scenarios, we are more prone to use a certain cognitive 
decision making system and less prone to use the other. 
We will answer the following objectives and test several hypotheses, which were 
grouped in accordance with the objective that they will help answer: 
 
1- Show that the decisions of subjects that were directed towards the intuitive 
cognitive system are effectively different from the ones of subjects directed towards the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system, and that the intuitive cognitive system is better at 
evaluating the overall quality of a given package, which is defined as the percentage of 
positive attributes versus the total number of attributes. The spread between the 
perceived values of the packages will allow us to evaluate the relative differences 
between the packages. In this case, an increase in the spread shows an increase in the 
difference of perceived quality in the two packages that are evaluated by each 
hypothesis. We aim to confirm the results obtained by Zakay et al. (2011), which 
showed that the intuitive cognitive system generated bigger spreads among packages, 
which means it perceived more differences in the quality of the packages. In simpler 
terms, it would mean that the intuitive cognitive system was better at weighing and 
evaluating the packages that were presented, and thus generated a better decision. 
H1: The difference between the perceived value of package C and package A 
will be bigger in the group that was directed towards the intuitive cognitive system than 
in the group that was directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
H2: The difference between the perceived value of package E and package A 
will be bigger in the group that was directed towards the intuitive cognitive system than 
in the group that was directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
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H3: The difference between the perceived value of package C and package E 
will be bigger in the group that was directed towards the intuitive cognitive system than 
in the group that was directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
 
2- Verify which of the manipulated groups is closer to the non-manipulated 
group in terms of answers. By doing this, we can conclude on which of the two 
cognitive systems is more used in normal decision making. H4 will compare the 
perceived values of the packages for each of the two manipulated groups with the 
perceived value of the same packages for the non-manipulated group. Our expectation 
for H4 is that it will show that our non-manipulated subjects were more likely to give 
the same perceived values as the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive 
system. However, we believe that these results will not be as clear as the results 
obtained in uncertain situations. The reason behind this belief is that when all the 
information is available, a rational analysis may appear to be better to the subject. 
 H4: The difference between the perceived value of package C and package E in 
the group directed towards the intuitive cognitive system will be closer to the spread 
between the perceived value of package C and package E in the group that was not 
manipulated than the spread between the perceived value of package C and package E 
in the group directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system.  
 
3- Understand the impact of the variation of the uncertainty level on the 
perceived value of the packages. By doing this, we will be able to analyze the behavior 
of each cognitive system when faced with uncertain scenarios, and understand if they 
behave in accordance with our expectations. H5, H6 and H7 will compare the perceived 
values of packages B, F and D within each of the manipulated groups to understand the 
impact of the variation of uncertainty on the perceived value of the packages. 
 Our expectation for H5 is that these perceived values will be different. While the 
packages have the same ratio of desirable and non-desirable aspects, we believe that the 
subjects directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system will be affected by 
risk-averse behaviors and penalize more uncertain packages. However, we must 
acknowledge that these risk-averse behaviors give a negative perceived value to 
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uncertain aspects, which are, by definition, non-measurable, and thus should not be 
considered in a rational analysis. 
H5: The perceived values of packages B, F and D will be equal in the group that 
was directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
Our expectation for H6 is that these perceived values will be different. While the 
packages have the same ratio of desirable and non-desirable aspects, we believe that the 
subjects directed towards the intuitive cognitive system will intuitively try to measure 
the uncertain aspects. We also believe that this group will be more affected by risk 
aversion behaviors, as they will not try to think rationally and ignore them. 
 H6: The perceived values of packages B, F and D will be different in the group 
that was directed towards the intuitive cognitive system. 
  Our expectation for H7 is that the perceived value of package D will be smaller 
than the perceived value of package B as the subject will penalize packages with more 
uncertain aspects despite the fact that the packages have the same ratio of desirable and 
non-desirable aspects. This penalization will be due to risk aversion behaviors. 
 H7: The perceived value of package D will be smaller than the perceived value 
of package B in the group that was directed towards the intuitive cognitive system. 
  
4- Verify which of the manipulated groups is closer to the non-manipulated 
group in terms of answers in different levels of uncertainty. By doing this, we will 
obtain the answer to our research question. We will be able to define which cognitive 
system has the most use in less uncertain scenarios and in more uncertain scenarios H8 
and H9 will compare the perceived values of the packages for each of the two 
manipulated groups with the perceived value of the same packages for the non-
manipulated group. 
Our expectations for H8 is that the perceived value of package B in the non-
manipulated group will be closer to the perceived value of package B in the group 
directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system than to the perceived value 
of package B in the group directed towards the intuitive cognitive system. This reflects 
the fact that this package is the least uncertain package of the three uncertain packages. 
As such, a rational analysis is easier (there aren’t as many unknown variables) in this 
package than on the other two packages. Thus, the non-manipulated group may feel 
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more tempted to perform a rational analysis of this package than of the other packages, 
which should be reflected in the perceived values given. 
 H8: The perceived value of package B in the non-manipulated group will be 
closer to the perceived value of package B in the group directed towards the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system than to the perceived value of package B in the 
group directed towards the intuitive cognitive system. 
Our expectations for H9 is that the perceived value of package D in the non-
manipulated group will be closer to the perceived value of package D in the group 
directed towards the intuitive cognitive system than to the perceived value of package D 
in the group directed towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system. This reflects 
the fact that this package is the most uncertain package of the three uncertain packages. 
As such, a rational analysis is more difficult (there are more unknown variables) in this 
package than on the other two packages. Thus, the non-manipulated group may feel 
more tempted to perform an intuitive analysis, which provides a better way of dealing 
with uncertainty, in this package than of the other packages, which should be reflected 
in the perceived values given. 
H9:  The perceived value of package D in the non-manipulated group will be 
closer to the perceived value of package D in the group directed towards the intuitive 
cognitive system than to the perceived value of package D in the group directed towards 
the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
 
3.2. Sample 
All of the answers were obtained from the same samples. The total number of 
people subject to the experiment was 215 (N=215). These 215 people were distributed 
among the groups in the following manner: 52 people participated in the experiment 
that manipulated participants towards a rational/deliberative cognitive system (N=52); 
121 people participated in the experiment that manipulated participants towards an 
intuitive cognitive system (N=121); 42 people participated in the experiment that did 
not manipulate participants towards any cognitive system (N=42). Our sample was 
mostly comprised of people between 18-22 years old (45,1%) and 23-26 years old 
(29,3%). The rest of the participants were either younger than 18 years old (12,1%) or 
older than 26 years old (13,5%). When dividing the participants by their academic 
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degree we found that more than half of the participants had a bachelor’s degree 
(55,3%). Other participants had either a master’s degree (15,3%) or a high school 
education (27,9%), with other degrees having a very small significance (1,4%). 
 
Table 3 Sample Description 
Groups 
Intuitive 
Group 
Rational Group 
Non-Manipulated 
Group 
Total Sample 
N= 121 52 42 215 
 
 
3.3. Results 
Before testing the hypotheses that were defined above, a homogeneity test of the 
sample was conducted to ensure that any variations of the dependent values are due to 
voluntary variations of the independent variables. These homogeneity tests compare the 
age and academic degree of the subjects. 
 
Table 4 Sample Homogeneity Tests 
Groups Age Degree 
Intuitive vs 
Rational/Deliberative vs  
Non-Manipulated 
X²(6)=3,727 ; p = 0,714 X²(8)=12,393 ; p = 0,135 
 
These values confirm that our samples are homogenous, and therefore our 
results will not be due to differences in the independent variables. 
Statistical testing of the nine hypotheses presented above, in accordance with the 
proposed methodology, allowed us to obtain the following results. 
H1 was tested using a two sample t-test assuming equal variances. This test 
showed that there were no significant differences between the group manipulated 
towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system (Mean= 0,9615 ; SD= 1,8360) and 
the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system (Mean=1,0826 ; SD= 
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1,4865); t(171)= 0,457, p= 0,648. There was, however, an inclination in the mean 
results that was consistent with what we were expecting (the intuitive cognitive system 
is better than the rational/deliberative cognitive system at perceiving differences in the 
packages). Nonetheless, this inclination isn’t statistically significant.  
 
Table 5 Group Statistics for H1 
 
 
Table 6 Independent Samples Test for H1 
 
 
H2 was tested using a two sample t-test assuming equal variances. This test 
showed that there were no significant differences between the group manipulated 
towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system (Mean= -0,9615 ; SD= 1,8253) and 
the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system (Mean= -0,9669 ; SD= 
1,6580); t(171)= -0,019, p= 0,985. There was, however, an inclination in the mean 
results that was consistent with what we were expecting (the intuitive cognitive system 
is better than the rational/deliberative cognitive system at perceiving differences in the 
packages). Nonetheless, this inclination isn’t statistically significant. More information 
about the statistic tests performed for testing H2 may be found in Annex C. 
 
Table 7 Group Statistics for H2 
 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Intuitive 121 1,0826 1,48653 0,13514
Rational 51 0,9615 1,83604 0,25461
Number
Spread CA
Equal variances 
assumed
0,457 171 0,648 0,12111 0,26511
Equal variances not 
assumed 0,42 81,048 0,675 0,12111 0,28825
Spread CA
t df Sig.(2-tailed) Mean Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Intuitive 121 -0,9669 1,65798 0,15073
Rational 52 -0,9615 1,82533 0,25313
Number
Spread CA
26 
 
 
Table 8 Independent Samples Test for H2 
 
 
H3 was tested using a two sample t-test assuming equal variances. This test 
showed that there were no significant differences between the group manipulated 
towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system (Mean= 1,9231 ; SD= 1,7472) and 
the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system (Mean= 2,0496 ; SD= 
2,0035); t(171)= 0,395, p= 0,693. There was, however, an inclination in the mean 
results that was consistent with what we were expecting (the intuitive cognitive system 
is better than the rational/deliberative cognitive system at perceiving differences in the 
packages). Nonetheless, this inclination isn’t statistically significant. More information 
about the statistic tests performed for testing H3 may be found in Annex D. 
 
Table 9 Group Statistics for H3 
 
 
Table 10 Independent Samples Test for H3 
 
 
H4 was tested using a one-way between subjects ANOVA analysis, in order to 
compare the effect of different cognitive systems on the perceived values given by the 
subjects of the three different groups. There was no significant effect of the different 
Equal variances 
assumed
-0,019 171 0,985 -0,0054 0,28348
Equal variances not 
assumed
-0,018 88,831 0,985 -0,0054 0,2946
Spread CA
t df Sig.(2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Intuitive 121 2,0496 2,00354 0,18214
Rational 52 1,9231 1,74722 0,2423
Number
Spread CA
Equal variances 
assumed
0,395 171 0,693 0,12651 0,32014
Equal variances not 
assumed
0,417 109,997 0,677 0,12651 0,30312
Spread CA
t df Sig.(2-tailed)
Mean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
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cognitive systems on the perceived values given by subjects at the p< 0,05 level for the 
different conditions [F(2, 212)= 0,234, p= 0,791]. Given the results, there is no 
significant relationship between the groups that we can highlight, and thus we cannot 
assume that one of the manipulated groups is closer to the non-manipulated group than 
the other manipulated group. More information about the statistic tests performed for 
testing H4 may be found in Annex E. 
 
Table 11 Spread CE for H4 
 
 
Table 12 ANOVA for H4 
 
 
H5 was tested using three paired samples t-tests to compare the results among 
the three uncertain scenarios for the group manipulated towards the rational/deliberative 
cognitive style. There was a significant difference between the perceived value of 
package B (M= 3,71 ; SD=2,003) and the perceived value of package D (M= 2,40 ; SD= 
1,774); t(51)= 4,635 , p= 0,000. There was a significant difference between the 
perceived value of package B (M= 3,71 ; SD= 2,003) and the perceived value of 
package F (M= 3,19 ; SD= 1,633); t(51)= 2,635 , p= 0,011. There was a significant 
difference between the perceived value of package F (M= 3,19 ; SD= 1,633) and the 
perceived value of package D (M= 2,40 ; SD= 1,774) ; t(51)= -3,792 , p= 0,000. These 
results clearly show that the perceived value given by participants manipulated towards 
the rational/deliberative cognitive system changes with differences in the level of 
uncertainty presented in the package, with more uncertain packages having a smaller 
perceived value. More information about the statistic tests performed for testing H5 may 
be found in Annex F. 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean Minimum Maximum
Intuitive 121 2,0496 2,00354 0,18214 -6,00 6,00
Rational 52 1,9231 1,74722 0,2423 -1,00 6,00
Non-Manipulated 42 1,8333 1,65156 0,25484 -2,00 6,00
Total 215 1,9767 1,87318 0,12775 -6,00 6,00
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 1,656 2 0,828 0,234 0,79
Within Groups 749,228 212 3,534
Total 750,884 214
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Table 13 Paired Samples Statistics for H5 
 
 
Table 14 Paired Samples Test for H5 
 
 
Table 15 Paired Samples Statistics for H5 
 
 
Table 16 Paired Samples Test for H5 
 
 
Table 17 Paired Samples Statistics for H5 
 
 
Table 18 Paired Samples Test for H5 
 
 
H6 was tested using three paired samples t-tests to compare the results among 
the three uncertain scenarios for the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package B 52 3,71 2,003 0,278
Package D 52 2,4 1,774 0,246
Number
Pair 1
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1
Package B - 
Package D
1,308 2,034 0,282 4,635 51 0,000
df Sig. (2-tailed)
Paired Differences
t
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package B 52 3,71 2,003 0,278
Package F 52 3,19 1,633 0,227
Number
Pair 1
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 Package B - 
Package F
0,519 1,421 0,197 2,635 51 0,011
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package D 52 2,4 1,774 0,246
Package F 52 3,19 1,633 0,227
Number
Pair 1
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 Package D - 
Package F -0,788 1,499 0,208 -3,792 51 0,000
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
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style. There was a significant difference between the perceived value of package B (M= 
3,59 ; SD= 1,662) and the perceived value of package D (M= 1,78 ; SD= 1,221); 
t(120)= 12,837 , p= 0,000. There was a significant difference between the perceived 
value of package B (M= 3,59 ; SD= 1,662) and the perceived value of package F (M= 
3,19 ; SD= 1,513); t(120)= 3,054 , p= 0,003. There was a significant difference between 
the perceived value of package F (M= 3,19 ; SD= 1,513) and the perceived value of 
package D (M= 1,78 ; SD= 1,221); t(120)= -12,311 , p= 0,000. These results clearly 
show that the perceived values given by participants manipulated towards the intuitive 
cognitive system change with differences in the uncertainty presented in the package. 
More information about the statistic tests performed for testing H6 may be found in 
Annex G. 
 
Table 19 Paired Samples Statistics for H6 
 
 
Table 20 Paired Samples Test for H6 
 
 
Table 21 Paired Samples Statistics for H6 
 
 
Table 22 Paired Samples Test for H6 
 
 
Table 23 Paired Samples Statistics for H6 
 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package B 121 3,59 1,662 0,151
Package D 121 1,78 1,221 0,111
Number
Pair 1
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 Package B - 
Package D
1,81 1,551 0,141 12,827 120 0,000
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package B 121 3,59 1,662 0,151
Package F 121 3,19 1,513 0,138
Pair 1
Number
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 Package B - 
Package F
0,397 1,429 1,3 3,054 120 0,003
Paired Differences
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package D 121 1,78 1,221 0,111
Package F 121 3,19 1,513 0,138
Number
Pair 1
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Table 24 Paired Samples Test for H6 
 
 
H7 was tested using a paired samples t-test to compare the results among 
package B and package D scenarios for the group manipulated towards the intuitive 
cognitive system. There was a significant difference between the perceived value of 
package B (M= 3,59 ; SD=1,662) and the perceived value of package D (M= 1,78 ; SD= 
1,221); t(120)=12,837 , p=0,000. These results clearly show that the perceived value of 
package D is smaller than the perceived value of package B. More information about 
the statistic tests performed for testing H7 may be found in Annex H. 
 
Table 25 Paired Samples Statistics for H7 
 
 
Table 26 Paired Samples Test for H7 
 
 
H8 was tested using a one-way between subjects ANOVA analysis, in order to 
compare the effect of uncertainty on the perceived values of package B given by the 
subjects of three different groups. There was no significant effect of different cognitive 
systems on the perceived values given by subjects at the p< 0,05 level for the different 
conditions [F(2, 212) = 0,114 , p= 0,8929]. Given the results, there is no significant 
relationship between the groups that we can highlight, and thus we cannot assume that 
one of the manipulated groups is closer to the non-manipulated group than the other 
manipulated group. However, we can see that the mean perceived value for the non-
manipulated group (M= 3,69 , SD= 1,760) is closer to the mean perceived value of the 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1 Package D - 
Package F -1,413 1,263 0,115 -12,311 120 0,000
Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed)
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Package B 121 3,59 1,662 0,151
Package D 121 1,78 1,221 0,111
Number
Pair 1
Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean
Pair 1
Package B - 
Package D
1,81 1,551 0,141 12,837 120 0,000
Paired Differences
t df Sig.(2-tailed)
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group manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system (M= 3,71 , SD= 
2,003) than to the mean perceived value of the group manipulated towards the intuitive 
cognitive system (M= 3,59 , SD= 1,662). Nonetheless, and as stated above, this remark 
is not statistically significant. More information about the statistic tests performed for 
testing H8 may be found in Annex I. 
 
Table 27 Package B Ratings 
 
 
Table 28 ANOVA for H8 
 
 
H9 was tested using a one-way between subjects ANOVA analysis, in order to 
compare the effect of uncertainty on the perceived values of package D given by the 
subjects of three different groups. There was a significant effect of different cognitive 
systems on the perceived values given by subjects at the p< 0,05 level for the different 
conditions [F(2, 212) = 4,176 , p= 0,017]. Post hoc testing with the Tukey HSD test 
showed that the mean perceived value of package D for the group manipulated towards 
the intuitive cognitive system (M= 1,78 , SD= 1,221) is significantly different than the 
mean perceived value of package D for the group manipulated towards the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system (M= 2,40 , SD= 1,774). Moreover, at the p < 0,10 
level there is a statistically significant difference between the perceived value of 
package D for the group manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system 
(M= 2,40 , SD= 1,774) and the group that was not manipulated (M= 1,79 , SD= 1,116). 
These results demonstrate that we may infer that the non-manipulated group’s results 
were closer to the group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system in scenarios 
of bigger uncertainty, as the perceived value of package D for non-manipulated group 
were significantly different from the group manipulated towards the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system but not significantly different from the ones 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean Minimum Maximum
Intuitive 121 3,59 1,662 0,151 1,00 8,00
Rational 52 3,71 2,003 0,278 1,00 8,00
Non-Manipulated 42 3,69 1,76 0,272 1,00 7,00
Total 215 3,64 1,761 0,12 1,00 8,00
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 0,714 2 0,357 0,114 0,89
Within Groups 662,988 212 3,127
Total 663,702 214
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obtained from the group manipulated towards intuitive cognitive system. More 
information about the statistic tests performed for testing H9 may be found in Annex J. 
 
Table 29 Package D Rating 
 
Table 30 ANOVA for H9 
 
Table 31 Tukey HSD for H9 
 
  
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. error mean Minimum Maximum
Intuitive 121 1,78 1,221 0,111 1,00 8,00
Rational 52 2,4 1,774 0,246 1,00 9,00
Non-Manipulated 42 1,79 1,116 0,172 1,00 5,00
Total 215 1,93 1,377 0,094 1,00 9,00
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 15,388 2 7,694 4,176 0,02
Within Groups 390,566 212 1,842
Total 405,953 214
(I) Number (J) Number Mean Difference (I-J) Standard Error Mean Sig.
Rational/Deliberative -0,627 0,225 0,016
Non-Manipulated -0,009 0,243 0,999
Intuitive 0,627 0,225 0,016
Non-Manipulated 0,618 0,282 0,074
Intuitive 0,009 0,243 0,999
Rational/Deliberative -0,618 0,282 0,074
Tukey HSD
Intuitive
Rational/Deliberative
Non-Manipulated
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4. Discussion 
Overall, the first three hypotheses results were consistent with our expectations. 
The results obtained did not show the differences we expected with statistical 
significance, though they did show a trend in the mean results that was similar to the 
results obtained by Zakay et al. (2011). Even though further research is needed, these 
results reflect the idea that the intuitive cognitive system is better at perceiving value 
between several options. Several reasons could be highlighted as potential causes of this 
lack of statistical significance. We would point out that one of the possible causes is that 
the difference in perceived value between the intuitive cognitive system and the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system is not dramatically different for the proposed 
choice, leading to mean values which are similar and fall within the range of lack of 
statistical significance. In other words, the decisions made by subjects are similar in 
these particular scenarios, regardless of the cognitive system used and the way that each 
cognitive system came to its conclusion. Other studies may try to elaborate on this, 
presenting subjects with choices that produce bigger differences between the intuitive 
cognitive system and the rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
The results obtained in H4 showed no trend whatsoever, a situation which may 
be due to the lack of difference between the intuitive cognitive system results and the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system results in a full information scenario. As such, we 
are not able to confirm which of the cognitive systems, intuitive or rational, is the 
preferred cognitive system in scenarios of perfect information. Nonetheless, this falls 
within our expectations that in full information scenarios the rational/deliberative 
cognitive system does not face difficulties of measurement, and remains an easy method 
to use. As explained above, an experience where choices produce bigger differences 
between the intuitive cognitive system and the rational/deliberative cognitive system 
could also benefit the testing of this hypothesis and show if there is in fact a trend 
towards one of the cognitive systems. As advanced when presenting H4, we maintain 
the belief that in a full information scenario subjects may be more inclined to rely on 
their rational/deliberative cognitive system. 
H5 results were aligned with our previous expectations, showing that subjects 
manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system still react to uncertainty 
in a significant way, preferring less uncertain packages to more uncertain packages. We 
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maintain that risk averse behaviors are the cause of these differences in perceived 
values, as advanced when introducing H5. This violates the assumption that the 
rational/deliberative cognitive system does not evaluate what it can’t measure. 
However, it also introduces the question of how and how well the rational/deliberative 
cognitive system measures uncertainty. We would advance that the subjects 
manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system adopted one of the 
features of the intuitive cognitive system, which has been discussed, to intuitively 
measure these uncertain aspects. In that sense, further studies could invest in 
understanding this process of combining two cognitive systems into the same analysis. 
It would be interesting to know which cognitive system took part in each part of the 
analysis, and how they mix in order to create a decision. 
H6 results were aligned with our previous expectations, showing that subjects 
manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system react to uncertainty in a significant 
way, preferring less uncertain packages to more uncertain packages. We maintain that 
risk averse behaviors are the cause of these differences in perceived values, as advanced 
when introducing H6. In this sense, we believe that subjects intuitively measured the 
presented uncertainty, and then managed to include this factor into the overall intuitive 
analysis. 
H7 allows us to confirm what we had already observed in H6, and further 
understand that uncertainty is viewed as a negative aspect by the subjects, thus showing 
us that subjects manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive style prefer less uncertain 
packages to more uncertain packages. 
The results obtained in H8 and H9 were in line with what we were expecting. In 
H8 we noticed a trend in the mean perceived values of the non-manipulated group 
which was closer to the group manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive 
system. In H9 we observed the opposite; the non-manipulated group was closer to the 
group manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system. The main conclusion we 
would draw from these two hypotheses is that our subjects from the non-manipulated 
group tended to think more intuitively as uncertainty increased, as expected. Once again 
we faced the problem of statistical significance in H8, which was analyzed previously, 
which can be approached in further studies. However, in H9 the results were statistically 
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significant and clearly showed a preference for the intuitive cognitive system in more 
uncertain scenarios.  
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5. Conclusion 
In the beginning of this dissertation we defined the following question as the key 
research question: “Do decision makers rely more on intuition as uncertainty increases 
or do they rely more on rational/deliberative decisions?”. 
After this, our study focused on understanding how the different cognitive 
systems worked, namely the rational/deliberative cognitive system and the intuitive 
cognitive system, and on what uncertainty is. Having understood that these different 
cognitive systems have very different, almost dichotomic, characteristics our 
understanding was they would generate different decisions in uncertain scenarios. 
Nonetheless, we found that there was very limited number of studies that empirically 
analyzed cognitive systems and uncertainty. This lack of research was mostly due to 
difficulties in measuring intuition, as we discussed during this dissertation. 
Our methodology focused on adapting a previous study by Zakay et al. (2011) 
and adding uncertain characteristics to it. Our subjects were faced with 6 different 
packages, which changed in their number of positive, negative and uncertain aspects, 
and asked to rate them in a scale of one to ten. By manipulating our subjects towards 
one of the two cognitive systems, using direct instruction, we were able to measure their 
perceived values of the presented packages. This result was then compared with the 
results obtained in the group that was not manipulated towards any cognitive system.  
Our results were consistent with those obtained by Zakay et al. (2011), albeit 
without statistical significance, showing that the intuitive cognitive system was better at 
recognizing differences among the packages.  We could not confirm our suspicion that 
the non-manipulated group was mainly using the intuitive cognitive system to rate the 
packages. We confirmed that the two manipulated groups preferred less uncertain 
packages to more uncertain packages, which we believe reflects risk averse behaviors. 
However, we highlight that uncertainty is different from risk, as explained in this 
dissertation, and there is no rational way of dealing with uncertainty as uncertainty is 
not measurable and the rational process states that inputs must be measurable in order to 
be analyzed and included in the rational decision making process. As we advanced, we 
suspect that the two manipulated groups used their intuition to assign a statistical 
distribution with a mean and standard deviation to the uncertain aspects instead of 
disregarding them. Even though something is not measurable, people may rely on their 
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intuition to present an estimation of its value. This is consistent with the processes of 
intuition, but not with rational processes. Thus, we would advance that even subjects 
manipulated towards the rational/deliberative cognitive system used their intuition as a 
tool for decision making in uncertain scenarios. Finally, and possibly the most 
interesting and innovative observation, we obtained the confirmation that people tend to 
rely more on their intuitive cognitive system in more uncertain scenarios (and less in 
less uncertain scenarios), which was consistent with our initial expectations. 
With these results we are now capable of answering our key research question: 
“Do decision makers rely more on intuition as uncertainty increases or do they rely 
more on rational/deliberative decisions?”. Our results showed that decision makers do 
rely more on intuition as uncertainty increases, as we suspected. 
As we have covered so far, our study suffers from some limitations. We also 
acknowledge there are a few improvements that could be done, mainly in addressing 
these limitations. First, and possibly the most important limitation we faced was related 
with the manipulation towards intuition and measurement of when the intuitive 
cognitive system was actually used. Measuring intuition was a topic that we analyzed 
during this work in order to understand how we would advance in our methodology. 
Previous studies had already covered this topic, stating the inherent difficulties of 
accurately measuring intuition (Dane & Pratt, 2009). Nonetheless, we tried to 
manipulate subjects towards intuition by direct instruction, one of the several methods 
of inducing subjects into a certain cognitive state. However, there is always room to 
improve the used instructions, in a way that produces a better manipulation, in order to 
obtain better results. Due to a lack of technical knowledge, we were also not able to 
apply other techniques in order to confirm if a subject was actually using the intuitive 
cognitive state. For instance, restricting the available decision time for the subject 
manipulated towards the intuitive cognitive system would have allowed us to obtain a 
better manipulation. Second, the packages used could be improved by taking into 
account the overall value that each subject attributed to each aspect of the package, for 
instance, by asking participants to distribute one hundred points between all of the 
aspects, with the most important aspects receiving more points. By doing so, we would 
be able to create custom packages which would better reflect the distribution of positive 
and negative aspects and ultimately would have been a better tool to eliminate possible 
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deviations. We would also highlight, once again, that this particular decision did not 
create key differences in judgment when comparing decisions made by subjects 
manipulated towards different cognitive systems, as the perceived values did not change 
much between groups. Further studies can change the decision, and obtain results that 
provide more differences, and thus allow us to obtain results that are statistically 
significant. 
Further studies could try to improve on the limitations portrayed above and also 
explore new fields within this range of uncertainty and decision making. For instance, 
new investigations could try to understand if decision making in uncertain scenarios 
changes in accordance with the topic of the decision. Decisions about professional 
matters and personal matters can be different, and may not change linearly with changes 
in uncertainty. For example, we may adopt the intuitive cognitive system in personal 
decisions in scenarios of low uncertainty, while in professional decisions we may adopt 
the intuitive cognitive system only in high uncertainty scenarios. Developing new ways 
of accurately inducing and measuring intuition are also needed, as the current tools are 
either not accurate enough or too sophisticated for widespread empirical testing which 
could grant us with new insights on decision making. 
The study of decision making in uncertain scenarios is a topic that can easily 
become a cornerstone for corporate decision making, and the proposed topics of 
investigation cover only a very small fraction of what may be studied. Therefore, further 
studies are welcome and can help in establishing a bridge between academia and real 
life decision making in uncertain scenarios, with positive outcomes for both 
counterparts. 
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7. Annexes 
 
Annex A. Experiment Description 
 
Attributes for holiday-alternatives ( as presented in Zakay et al. (2011)) 
- Good/bad weather 
- Friendly/not friendly staff 
- Easy/not easy access 
- Variety of activities (limited) 
- Nice/limited room view 
- Many/few near restaurants 
- Breakfast (not) included 
- Many/no proximal shops 
- Rooms are (not) air-conditioned 
- There is (no) TV in the room 
- (No) beautiful beaches 
- Small/spacious rooms 
 
 
Used packages: 
 
a) Package A 
- Good weather 
- Friendly staff 
- Difficult access 
- Limited variety of activities 
- Nice room view 
- Few near restaurants 
- Breakfast not included 
- Many proximal shops 
- Rooms are air-conditioned 
- There is no TV in the room 
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- Beautiful beaches 
- Small rooms 
 
b) Package B 
- Good weather 
- Friendly staff 
- No information on accesses 
- Limited variety of activities 
- Nice room view 
- No information on the number of nearby restaurants 
- Breakfast not included 
- No information on the number of proximal shops 
- No information on wether the rooms are air-conditioned or not 
- There is no TV in the room 
- Beautiful beaches 
- Small rooms 
 
c) Package C 
- Good weather 
- Friendly staff 
- Easy access 
- Limited variety of activities 
- Nice room view 
- Many near restaurants 
- Breakfast not included 
- Many proximal shops 
- Rooms are air-conditioned 
- There is no TV in the room 
- Beautiful beaches 
- Small rooms 
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d) Package D 
- Good weather 
- No information about staff 
- No information on accesses 
- No information on the variety of activities 
- No information about room view 
- No information on the number of nearby restaurants 
- No information about breakfast being included or not 
- No information on the number of proximal shops 
- No information on wether the rooms are air-conditioned or not 
- No information on wether there is a TV in the room or not 
- No information about beaches 
- Small rooms 
 
e) Package E 
- Good weather 
- Friendly staff 
- Difficult access 
- Limited variety of activities 
- Nice room view 
- Few near restaurants 
- Breakfast not included 
- No proximal shops 
- Rooms are not air-conditioned 
- There is no TV in the room 
- Beautiful beaches 
- Small rooms 
 
f) Package F 
- Good weather 
- Friendly staff 
- No information on accesses 
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- No information on the variety of activities 
- No information about room view 
- No information on the number of nearby restaurants 
- Breakfast not included 
- No information on the number of proximal shops 
- No information on wether the rooms are air-conditioned or not 
- There is no TV in the room 
- Beautiful beaches 
- Small rooms 
 
Experiment instructions (adapted from Zakay et al. (2011)) 
 
a) Reasoning condition 
Imagine you have to choose a holiday package for your next vacation. You will be 
presented with information about six hypothetical vacation packages, described by 
various (positive/negative) attributes. You will then be asked to rate your evaluation of 
all six vacation packages (how “good” or “bad” you feel it would be to undertake the 
presented vacation) on a scale of 1–10. Research has shown that the best decisions are 
made using logic and rational thought. Therefore it is important that you think-carefully 
and logically about how much you like each vacation package. In particular, you should 
think about the reasons you have to prefer one vacation package to another one. You 
will be given as much time as you will need to make your judgment (but this will be 
done from memory, you cannot take notes). After you have made your decision you will 
be asked to justify it by giving the reasons for your choice. 
 
b) Intuitive condition 
Imagine you have to choose a holiday package for your next vacation. You will now 
be presented with information about six hypothetical vacation packages, described by 
various (positive/negative) attributes. You will then be asked to rate your evaluation of 
all six vacation packages (how “good” or “bad” you feel it would be to undertake the 
presented vacation) on a scale of 1–10. Research has shown that the best decisions are 
made using intuition rather than logic. Therefore, try to base your evaluation and choice 
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preference on your GUT-FEELING about how much you like or dislike the six vacation 
packages, rather than trying to think logically or rationally about them. You will be 
given as much time as you will need to make your judgment (but this will be done from 
memory, you cannot take notes). Remember that you should only use your intuitive 
feeling. 
 
c) Unbiased condition 
Imagine you have to choose a holiday package for your next vacation. You will now 
be presented with information about six hypothetical vacation packages, described by 
various (positive/negative) attributes. You will then be asked to rate your evaluation of 
all six vacation packages (how “good” or “bad” you feel it would be to undertake the 
presented vacation) on a scale of 1–10.. You will be given as much time as you will 
need to make your judgment (but this will be done from memory, you cannot take 
notes). 
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Annex B. Other results for H1 
 
 
Table 32 Levene's Test for Equality of Variances for H1 
 
 
 
 
  
F Sig.
Equal variances 
assumed
0,136 0,713
Equal variances 
not assumed
Spread CA
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Annex C. Other results for H2 
 
 
Table 33 Levene's Test for Equality of Variances for H2 
 
 
 
  
F Sig.
Equal variances 
assumed
0,727 0,395
Equal variances not 
assumed
Spread CA
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Annex D. Other results for H3 
 
 
Table 34 Levene's Test for Equality of Variances for H3 
 
 
 
 
  
F Sig.
Equal variances 
assumed
0,100 0,752
Equal variances not 
assumed
Spread CA
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Annex E. Other results for H4 
 
 
Table 35 Homogeneity of variances Test for H4 
 
 
Table 36 Tukey HSD for H4 
 
 
Table 37 Tukey HSD for H4 
 
  
2 212 0,6470,436
Levene's Statistics df 1 df 2 Sig.
(I) Number (J) Number Mean Difference (I-J) Standard Error Mean Sig.
Intuitive Rational/Deliberative 0,12651 0,31172 0,913
Non-Manipulated 0,21625 0,33668 0,797
Rational/Deliberative Intuitive -0,12651 0,31172 0,913
Non-Manipulated 0,08974 0,39001 0,971
Non-Manipulated Intuitive -0,21625 0,33668 0,797
Rational/Deliberative -0,08974 0,39001 0,971
Tukey HSD
Subset for alpha = 0,05
1
Non-Manipulated 42 1,8333
Rational 52 1,9231
Intuitive 121 2,0496
Sig. 0,808
Tukey HSD
Number N
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Annex F. Other results for H5 
 
 
Table 38 Paired Samples Correlations for H5 
 
 
Table 39 Paired Samples Correlations for H5 
 
 
Table 40 Paired Sample Correlations for H5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package B & Package D 52 0,425 0,002
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package B & Package F 52 0,712 0,000
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package D & Package F 52 0,615 0,000
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Annex G. Other results for H6 
 
 
Table 41 Paired Samples Correlations for H6 
 
 
Table 42 Paired Samples Correlations for H6 
 
 
Table 43 Paired Samples Correlations for H6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package B & Package D 121 0,455 0,000
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package B & Package F 121 0,598 0,000
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package D & Package F 121 0,591 0,000
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Annex H. Other results for H7 
 
 
Table 44 Paired Samples Correlations for H7 
 
 
 
 
  
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Package B & Package D 121 0,455 0,000
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Annex I. Other results for H8 
 
 
Table 45 Levene's Statistics for H8 
 
 
Table 46Tukey HSD for H8 
 
 
Table 47 Tukey HSD for H8 
  
2 212 0,058
Levene's Statistics df 1 df 2 Sig.
2,885
(I) Number (J) Number Mean Difference (I-J) Standard Error Mean Sig.
Rational/Deliberative -0,125 0,293 0,905
Non-Manipulated -0,104 0,317 0,943
Intuitive 0,125 0,293 0,905
Non-Manipulated 0,021 0,367 0,998
Intuitive 0,104 0,317 0,943
Rational/Deliberative -0,021 0,367 0,998
Non-Manipulated
Rational/Deliberative
Intuitive
Tukey HSD
Subset for alpha = 0,05
1
Intuitive 121 3,59
Rational 52 3,71
Non-Manipulated 42 3,69
Sig. 0,923
N
Tukey HSD
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Annex J. Other results for H9 
 
 
Table 48 Levene's for H9 
 
 
Table 49 Tukey HSD for H9 
 
 
 
2 212 0,002
Levene's Statistics df 1 df 2 Sig.
6,166
1 2
Intuitive 121 1,78
Rational 52 2,4
Non-Manipulated 42 1,79
Sig. 0,999 1
Tukey HSD
Subset for alpha = 0,05
N
